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INTRODUCTION
The contestability of `justice' is not only the stuff of philosophical treatises and political theories, but is also the inspirational catalyst of social movements of all kinds. Protest marches, hunger strikes, petitions, boycotts and media campaigns constitute a familiar imagery of the contestation of `justice' in the public sphere.
What tends to be omitted, however, from this conventional repertoire of `justice activism' is any reference to `folk humour' and the ways in which it works to destabilise and scrutinise what we mean by 'justice', both politically and ethically.
Using the humorous form of stand-up comedy, this paper will consider the subversive possibilities of a televisual carnival of laughter, and how far it constitutes an important counterpublic sphere which promotes critical deliberation and engagement with questions of `justice' in a liberal democratic society.
Recent developments in public sphere theory have called into question Habermasian notions of the nature of public debate and mediated dialogue. Habermas's insistence on such dialogue as constituting a rule-based, 'ideal speech situation', as informed by communicative rationality, and as seeking consensus based on universal norms and principles, has exposed him to the charge of failing to recognise the exclusivity of his particular version of discourse ethics (Benhabib, 1986; Calhoun, 1992; Outhwaite, 1994; Crossley and Roberts, 2004) . Discursive media and practices which do not fit the Habermasian mould of 'ideal speech' are discredited and delegitimised as deliberative modalities of political engagement; or are silenced, marginalised and excluded as instances of public dialogue. Such discursive spaces have been theorised as counterpublic spheres (Asen, 2000; Asen and Brouwer, 2001; Warner, 2002) , and this is a concept which acknowledges that public debate is mobilised discursively within and through a heterogeneity of cultural media. On this view, Hollywood cinema, reality TV, video-gaming, cartoons and stand-up comedy, for example, are as crucial for democratic deliberation and participatory engagement as are government pamphlets, citizens' juries, town hall meetings, public inquiries, e-petitions and consensus conferences. As Asen and Brouwer put it, such media function as discursive spaces of 'critical publicity ' (2001: 6) , a notion which denotes not only the reflexive interaction of resistance and power, but also how political relationships between margin and centre are discursively and culturally accomplished.
A counterpublic sphere perspective connects with the theoretical and epistemological work of contemporary cultural criminological scholarship and the political legacy of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies which runs through it (Hall et al, 1978; Gilroy, 1987; Hall and Jefferson, 1993; Gray et al, 2007) . Through the innovative lens of the cultural criminological project, we not only come to understand and celebrate the seductive, existential pleasures of transgressive, liminal and resistive practices, but we have come to value inter alia humour, artworks, 'true crime' fiction, fashion, extreme sports, urban leisure, roadside shrines and billboards as important sites and forms of alternative critical discourse -as media of critical publicity. Moreover, a cultural criminological outlook encourages us to read culture politically, nurturing an activist orientation suggestive of an interventionist politics of cultural transformation -see, for example, Katz (1988) ; Ferrell and Sanders (1995) ; Presdee (2000) ; Theoretical Criminology (2004: Special Issue on Cultural Criminology, 8(3)); Hayward (2004) ; Valier (2004) ; Ferrell, Hayward and Young (2008) .
However, it is one thing to assert that cultural media -in this context stand-up comedy -promotes a critical dialogue on the issues of the day, and thereby constitutes an important counterpublic sphere of resistive politics, but it is quite another to theorise its value, function and meaning within philosophical debates of the kind of 'justice' and the kind of 'just society' we might aspire to. In other words, in a post-9/11 era where intensified securitisation reconfigures the meaning(s) of 'justice', the multiplicity of ways in which such meaning(s) may be discursively constructed and communicated, is not only a pressing political issue but is also of particular theoretical concern. What model of justice permits and sustains the inclusion of discursive modes which do not conform to Habermasian notions of ideality, universality and rationality? This, then, is where the paper makes a significant contribution to theoretical work which seeks to link the politics of the cultural criminological imagination to broader philosophical questions about 'justice'. While 'folk humour' provides the empirical ground for making such a link, it is achieved analytically through the critical juxtaposition of Habermasian discourse ethics with Bakhtinian dialogism, using Hudson's (2003) model of 'justice' -premised on principles of relationality, discursivity, plurivocality and reflectivity -as a template for theoretical comparison.
JUSTICE AND SECURITISATION
`Justice', like `community', `culture' and `identity', constitutes one of life's `essentially contested' (Gallie, 1956) and `essentially contestable' (Clarke, 1979) concepts. Its contestability is not only the stuff of philosophical treatises and political theories, but it often serves as the inspirational catalyst of social movements and forms of resistance of all kinds. In her eloquent monograph on the nature of Justice in the Risk Society (2003) , Barbara Hudson draws from a wide number of divergent Western philosophical traditions, including liberalism, communitarian, feminist and poststructuralist critiques, to suggest a number of conditions of possibility for achieving 'justice' in late modernity; she writes:
Justice must be: relational -it must take account of relationships between individuals, groups and communities; discursive -it must allow claims and counter-claims, critiques and defences of existing values to be weighed against each other in undominated discourse; plurivocal -it must recognise and hear the different voices of the plurality of identities and social groups that must have their claims met and find ways of living together, in radically pluralist contemporary societies; …… reflective -justice must flow from consideration of the particulars of the individual case rather than subsuming unique circumstances under general categories (Hudson 2003: 206: 
Emphasis added).
Whilst it may be easy to see the accommodative potential of Hudson's criteria for `justice', they still amount to a set of normative ideals which are difficult, if not impossible, to either realise or live up to -and this is especially so when our need for `justice' is combined with demands for other states of existence. In other words, even if we agree with Hudson's model of `doing justice in the risk society', how we square any version of `justice' with other fundamental tenets of liberal democratic societieslimited government, individual responsibility, freedom, equality, respect, human rights, security -is a moot point.
In the post-9/11 era, the coupling of `justice' and `security' has become an especially pressing concern with many arguing that fears of terrorism, and of other threats posed by, for example, paedophilia, cybercrime, violent, predatory crime, organised crime and anti-social behaviour, has encouraged a preference for forms of justice which prioritise security over freedom, or which sacrifice the latter for the former (Benhabib, 2002; Bigo, 2002; Jayasuriya, 2002; Meyers, 2002; Sparks, 2003) . Within the terms of social contract theory, if the security of persons and properties is the precondition of freedom, there will always be a trade-off between the two. Against a prevailing meta-narrative of ontological insecurity, disembeddedness, suspicion, uncertainty and risk -see, for example, Giddens (1991) , Beck (1992) -the preservation of a just society premised on individual freedom is no longer an abstract, philosophical matter but is increasingly the stuff of intensive and heated political debate. Indeed, Benhabib (2002: 1) talks of the advent of an `unholy politics', a new form of struggle in the post-9/11 period which threatens `to dissolve the boundaries of the political in liberal democracies' -boundaries which mark out conventional moral and political distinctions between, for example, enemies and allies, the guilty and the innocent, peace and war, civilian and military. Meyers (2002) also seeks to `defend politics' from a contemporary ethic of retribution which, he argues, responds to terrorism only by jettisoning communication and dialogue in favour of force and violence -as he puts it `(f)reedom depends on politics and politics depends on speech ' (2002: 3) . Jayasurika makes a similar argument; in a persuasive account of the `(anti-)politics of security' in the aftermath of 9/11, he warns that:
The most serious danger these events pose is their ability to usher in, under the appealing cloak of `security', a debilitating form of `anti-politics' that marginalises the constructive conflicts -the debate and the discussion -that animate the public sphere in liberal polities (2002: 1) .
In each of these accounts, there is not only an assumption of a sea-change in the nature of political deliberation about security in insecure times, but it is further inferred that the policy response to risk, danger, threat and uncertainty is primarily one based on the resurgence of sovereign and authoritarian forms of rule. Meyers (2002) claims that public debate on these matters has been reduced to a kind of `speechless shock', and that the imagery of violent excess, whether instigated by `the bestial' (terrorists) or `the god-like' (democratic governments), undermines the capacities and dispositions of the citizenry to engage in meaningful dialogue in the public sphere. There is certainly no shortage of claims which suggest that an excessive concern with security has overwhelmed any preference for a just society based on equality of freedom, but how far this is illustrative of an orientation to what Dean refers to as `authoritarian liberalism ' (2002a, 2002b) 2 , or is indicative of a `new punitiveness' (Bottoms, 1995; Garland, 2001a Garland, , 2001b Pratt et al., 2005; Pratt, 2007) is not at all clear. Perrin (2005) , for example, using the occasion of the 9/11 attacks, identifies the co-presence of authoritarian and anti-authoritarian sentiments within political culture; while Hutton (2005) questions the notion of a monolithic public disposition and presents empirical data to demonstrate that punitive, reactionary views co-exist with less visceral and more `rational', reflective attitudes to security and protection -see also Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and Hough (2003) . The idea of a populist bandwagon driving forward an illiberal agenda of authoritarian justice may have a prima facie appeal, but it relies on a selective and partial reading of contemporary discourses and practices of securitisation, and also rests on a limited understanding of the nature of and scope for deliberative dialogue about matters of security and governance.
Not only is there good ground to support the view of a mixed economy of security practices (O'Malley, 1999 (O'Malley, , 2008 Matthews, 2005) , but demands for the proliferation of (ever)more intrusive modes of security and protection rarely go unchallenged, and are as fiercely contested as they are made. My mother is very patient but sometimes when she missed him too much she gets depressed …. I really hate it when she gets depressed. At school when it is time to go home most of the children have their fathers pick them up which makes me miss him even more …… you understand this as a father and husband. It is not nowhere near fun to be without a father, we've missed so much (Aamer, 2010) .
Whether Johina's letter will, as she hopes, 'make a difference' is yet to be seen but, in any event, will depend on the kind of 'justice' which acknowledges, understands and 
HABERMAS AND BAKHTIN ON 'JUSTICE'
There is now a substantial and influential literature which critically juxtaposes
Habermasian theorisations (of the public sphere, communicative rationality, discourse ethics, ideal speech situation, universal pragmatics and deliberative democracy) with the ideas and thinking of his contemporaries -most especially Foucault (Kelly, 1994) , Arendt (Benhabib, 1992) , Rawls (Lafont, 2003) , Gadamer (How, 1985) , Levinas (Trey, 1992) , and more latterly Derrida (Borradori, 2003) . Even so, Nielsen points out that `(n)o matter how widely Mikhail Bakhtin and Jürgen Habermas might be recognised as key figures of twentieth century critical theory, they are rarely considered together ' (1995: 803) . 7 Nielsen (1995) suggests that the absence of comparative work on Habermas and Bakhtin may be a reflection of their assumed disciplinary affiliations -where the former is primarily associated with philosophy, political science and sociology, and the latter is located within literary criticism or cultural studies. However, and despite such imposed disciplinary boundaries, both theorists share common ground in a number of important respects. For Garvey (2000: 371) these include firstly, a concern for egalitarian communicative relationships;
secondly, a focus on how subjectivities and intersubjectivities are structured and mediated by communicative practice; thirdly, an expectation that communicative action exposes and, therefore, challenges power differentials; and fourthly, a commitment to regarding communicative relationships as a special (demystifying) form of social critique which will help to define an alternative ethics. However, it is equally important not to overstate the case for commonality, not least because this loses sight of Bakhtin's alternative, and in many ways unique framework for problematizing and exploring notions of the public sphere, discourse and `justice'.
Moreover, it may be that the kind of 'dialogic justice' informed by Bakthinian concepts yield the more persuasive framework for understanding how discursivity in the public sphere may work to promote the kinds of `justice' and forms of security we endeavour to achieve in liberal democratic societies.
Words with a sideways glance
Jürgen Habermas (inter alia 1984 Habermas (inter alia , 1987 Habermas (inter alia , 1989 Habermas (inter alia [1962 Habermas (inter alia ], 1992 Habermas (inter alia , 1993 Habermas (inter alia , 1996 wrote extensively on the concept of the public sphere and his work often serves as the starting point for discussions about the discursive conditions of possibility for engendering a participatory democratic society premised on equality, justice and freedom (Asen and Brouwer, 2001; Roberts and Crossley, 2004 dialogical model of language which regards utterances as part of an endless chain of significations, and the word as the terrain of an intense ideological struggle (Gardiner, 2004: 36 white three-piece suits, they had gold chains connected to black briefcases. They had one eyebrow between the two of them ….. (audience laughs)…. And they were sat there going 'ahrr-ahrr-eh-la-la-eh-la-la-arhh' …… mimicking a pseudo-Arabic language and posturing as though two people were engrossed in a conversation.
And I thought, bloody hell, I'm not getting on the plane, they look so suspicious ….
audience laughing …. you've got to be joking …. pause …. We're sat in the lounge and I thought I'd look at everyone else and see what they were thinking … pause …. Nothing is straightforward about this dialogue. The use of stereotypes in comedy invites its own controversies, with some critics pointing out its role in the propagation of racist, sexist and homophobic ideologies (Billig, 2001; Howitt and OwusuBempah, 2009; Lockyer and Pickering, 2009) . Notwithstanding the potential cruelty of laughter and its possible recruitment 'in the service of conservatism as well as radicalism' (Billig, 2005: 131) , Djalili succeeds, as do others, in mobilising stereotypes in a way which creates discomfort in the midst of laughter, as audience members (perhaps) confront their preconceived notions of the kinds of 'risky populations' who pose a threat. I am not suggesting that this is how this particular stand-up routine was interpreted, nor that it has any singular message to impart -nor even that it is 'funny'. However, the example exemplifies the Bakhtinian appreciation of the 'impurity' and 'multi-accentedeness' of language. In other words, we can deliberate, contemplate and encounter notions of 'justice' in ways which are quite alien to the exclusionary, soberly medium of an 'ideal speech situation', and which (possibly) engage us on a much more embodied and visceral level. There is a 'cryptic rawness' to the dialogue of stand-up comedy; it is confrontative, sometimes aggressive in its delivery and is invariably articulated through profanities rather than measured prose. Nonetheless, it can make a relatively uncomplicated point about arriving at a `provisional consensus' (Gardiner, 2004: 39) . Rather, the opacity of language, its undecidability and its value-laden, expressive and aesthetic qualities are intrinsic features of language in use -as Bakhtin puts it, `(l)anguages are philosophies, not abstract, but concrete, social philosophies, penetrated by a system of values inseparable from living practice and class struggle ' (1984: 471) ; and in dialogue, `a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with the whole body and deeds' (ibid: 293).
Consider, for example, Cole's and Dempsey's assertion that the events of 9/11, `… sparked a fundamental debate about the tension between liberty and security … (and) about the capability of our (sic) government to keep us secure within the confines of due process, respect for freedoms of speech and association, and a system of government powers subject to checks and balances ' (2002: ix Throughout the clip, Ahmed raises a number of serious questions concerning stereotyping, mistaken identity, discrimination, suspiciousness, -in short, injusticesbut presents them through a series of embodied and humorous gestures, fully capturing the aesthetic, emotional and animated experiences and particularities of everyday Arab-American life. Drawing on the exaggerated ribaldry and spectacle of carnival, its comic, verbal and visual compositions, as well as its profanities, Ahmed creates a range of irreverent images which mock the abstract representations of `justice' and security which surround us. This is nowhere better exemplified than in his assertion that `security's got so bad now, I just roll up to the airport in a G-string'.
The importance which Bakhtin places on the `dense particularity of lived experience' (Gardiner, 2004: 42) What I want to suggest here is that the folk humour of Axis and its reproduction across a multiplicity of sites (`grotesque symposia') and through a 'heteroglossia' (more about this below) of communicative forms (film, live performance, TV interview, recorded performance, printed interview, documentary, cyber and digital media) 13 constitute a series of `counterpublic spheres' (Asen, 2000) in which the kind of `justice' which puts security first is deliberated, scandalised, resisted, scrutinised, mocked and destabilised within the moment of the carnivalesque.
Styles of speaking
A myriad of 'grotesque symposia' will also host a 'heteroglossia' of parodic and satirical forms, comedic inversions, stylistic degradations, and pluralistic, conflicting modes of address. 'Heteroglossia' is a term which Bakhtin introduces in the essay, (1981[1935] ): whereas dialogism refers to the relational properties of language (Vice, 1997: 50) -and is concerned with questions of inter-and intratextuality, and the interaction between text and context -heteroglossia is descriptive of `differentiated speech' and is `Bakhtin's key term for describing the complex stratification of language into genre, register, sociolect, dialect, and the mutual interanimation of these forms' (White, 1993: 136) . Put another way, if we want to achieve the kind of `justice' which fosters egalitarian relationships between individuals, groups and communities, then the desire for communicative clarity will only create hierarchies of value and legitimacy, ultimately disqualifying informal, marginal, subaltern and subversive discourses, as well as alternative discursive modalities -such as graffiti, blogs, street protests, diaries, jokes and This does not suppose that sensitivity to the diversity of language use will result in `peaceful relativity' or `inert co-existence', but will, rather, produce a `clash of discourses' or `dialogized heteroglossia' (Vice, 1997: 49) . Far from excluding minority language forms, `dialogized heteroglossia' is an important means of empowerment, and one `that is very different from that granted by the bracketing and testing procedures of Habermasian practical discourse' (Garvey, 2000: 382) . It is only amidst heteroglossia that we are able to situate our own language in relation to others, use this positioning as a resource for resisting homogenizing and authoritative discourses, or conversely `use discourses out of context to create ironic distance, and so on' (ibid: 382). In a number of performances, discursive positionality and the effects/qualities of differentiated speech are themselves ripe for comedic observation. International, and in so doing introduces profanity as a legitimate discursive style.
Discourse in the Novel
Mulling over potential new names for the human rights organisation, he suggests, 'Let those guys go, you fuckers'. Both Grant and Rivron question whether it is possible to swear -`Are we allowed to swear?' they ask; to which Izzard replies:
Yes, I think it's important … Rivron interrupting … it is the essence of freedom of speech … Izzard continuing ….. it's freedom of speech. When I was at school they said it showed a lack of vocabulary, and I said, no, I've got an excellent vocabulary, look at all those swear words. It shows an increased vocabulary … pause …. like fuckers.
17

Hearing different voices
A public sphere characterised by heteroglossia will also be one which recognises a polyphony of different voices, and `voices with equal rights' at that (Vice, 1997: 112) .
In a polyphonic deliberation of `justice', each participant voice articulates a recognisable viewpoint and has an equal right to speak. This appears to be indicative of restorative justice where victim/offender deliberation serves as a model of `justice' which is both discursive and plurivocal. As Hudson suggests:
Where restorative justice practice approximates to the ideals of its theorists, it
incorporates the principles that justice should be discursive; that it should be responsive to the circumstances of the particular case rather than subsuming individual acts and actors under general classes, and that it should allow a plurality of voices within the discourse (2003: 210: Emphasis added).
Despite its promise, however, Hudson is cautious about restorative justice's propensity to achieve the `dense relationism' required for a model of justice which claims to restore the fractured relationships between offenders, victims and communities. This is where the Bakhtinian emphasis on the dialogic has clear advantages over a Habermasian discourse ethics. That is, polyphony is also dialogic in form (as is heteroglossia); in polyphonic -rather than (merely) plurivocaldialogue, heterogeneous voices are not merely acknowledged, articulated and heard but they also enter into dialogical relationships with each other, promoting reflectivity of other participants' situated and particularised standpoints. Dialogized polyphony (and heteroglossia), then, is crucial to nurturing a `just' society which values egalitarian and democratically organised public spheres; equally, it promotes a `dialogized' kind of `justice' which is both dynamic and relational, and rooted in everyday experiences. I'm not saying he can't read, I'm just saying that he probably prefers others reading to him'. This, it turns out, is the punch-line, and it is this point which closes off the sequence about the Patriot Act amidst thunderous laughter, whistling, whooping and clapping.
A carnival of 'justice'
Bakhtin's preoccupation with the particularity and materiality of human existence, and the dialogical focus on the ambivalence and contingency of the everyday, should not be considered in isolation of his concern for the carnivalesque (Gardiner, 2004: 42) . Indeed, Kosik points out that `(t)he everyday …. has its replicability but also its special occasions, its routine but also its festivity. The everyday is thus not meant as a contrast to the unusual, the festive, the special ' (1976 ' ( : 43 cited in Gardiner, 2004 .
In other words, Bakhtin's `prosaic outlook' is not antithetical to `the carnivalesque'; rather, the celebratory forms of the carnivalesque draw our attention to the subversive, transgressive and scandalising aspects of socio-cultural life -those aspects which challenge received wisdoms, `commonsensical notions and habitualized viewpoints … to encourage a renewed awareness of the hidden and all-too-often suppressed potentialities that lie within the (everyday)' (Gardiner, 2004: 42) . Vice (1997: 151-153 ) sets out several key features of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque which are worthy of reporting at length here:
1) Ritual spectacles ….; 2) comic verbal compositions ….; 3) various genres of billingsgate ….; 4) (carnival's) …. suspension of `hierarchical structure and all the forms of terror, reverence, piety, and etiquette connected with it' 122); 5) carnival allows `free and familiar contact between people … and allows for mass action' (ibid: 123); 6) … unusual combinations `the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid' (ibid: 123); 7) …. profanation … to the level of the body, particularly in the case of parodies of sacred texts; 8) death and renewal are central to carnival … ; 9) carnival laughter is directed at exalted objects …. ; 10) `everything has its parody, that is, its laughing aspect' (ibid, p 128).
Consider, for example, the way in which each comedian enters into the performance of Axis. Walking on stage via an airport security-screen, staffed by an AfricanAmerican woman, Obeidallah is questioned about his name, but let through because `he don't look like no Arabic'. Ahmed is subjected to a sexual assault masquerading as a body search -his bottom is smacked as he walks away. Jobrani is identified as needing a cavity search but he offers a bribe and is cleared to continue. Kader arrives carrying a rucksack and sets off the security alarms; but the woman is gossiping on her mobile and, failing to see/hear this, she allows Kader to walk through unchallenged. These mini-scenarios encourage us to question how far securityconscious justice can protect civil liberties. In the security check sequences, we confront a form of justice in which Otherness resides in a name (Obeidallah); is a basis for sexual harassment (Ahmed); and is disregarded for a fee (Jobrani). What makes this scandalous and mocking of official culture is its stark portrayal of what an everyday lived experience of heightened security for some communities might look like. Lewis notes that `public opinion about civil liberties in the context of terrorism is often formulated in terms of a trade-off, that is, the extent to which civil liberties must be or should be sacrificed for security ' (2005: 23) ; she goes on to demonstrate how, faced with an abstract trade-off, the American public (except for a few months in the immediate aftermath of September 11) reject the need to sacrifice personal freedoms for the sake of enhanced protection against terrorism. By contrast, when concrete trade-offs are proposed -for example, implementing random searches, detaining people at airports on the basis of religion, ID checks at all workplaces and public buildings (Lewis, 2005 : Tables 6 and 7 ) -surveys suggest that the public tend to endorse the exercise of enhanced government anti-terrorist powers (Yalof and Dautrich, 2002: 57-62) . It is one thing to deliberate this issue through academic argument or reasoned debate, but here the impact of a concrete trade-off is overtly scandalised and is undermined by the immediacy of its impact on individual Others.
Moreover, as far as Kader's entrance is concerned, this mocks and challenges the very idea of achieving a balance between protection and freedom in a liberal democratic society. That is, any preference for a security-led model of `justice' supposes a simple trade-off between risk and danger as potential threats to freedom, and the immediate returns of protective measures. In other words, the inference in the question of balance is that the security gain is `real'. Despite the rhetoric of `uniting and strengthening America' and the pledge to `provide (the) appropriate tools If `everything has its parody', then there is no reprieve for 'justice' as object of the carnivalesque. Indeed, a Bakhtinian model of `justice' offers an innovative framework for thinking about contemporary (over-)reactions to presumed `clear and present dangers'. Although it is fashionable to characterise public dialogue about matters of security and protection as populist, and supportive of the return of a punitive, authoritarian regime of criminal justice and penality, this often relies on a narrowly conceived notion of the public sphere. Re-read through the lens of key Bakhtinian concepts -dialogism; heteroglossia; polyphony; and the carnivalesque -a public sphere is not limited to the soberly realm of an Habermasian ideal speech situation, but has multiple forms and manifold possibilities.
TOWARDS 'DIALOGIZED JUSTICE'
Hudson's (2003) suggested framework for achieving `justice' in a risk society is highly commendable, and is indicative of her intellectual commitment to a critical criminological project. Indeed, her distillation of a series of normative ideals for the realisation of a `just society' contributes substantially to what van Swaaningen describes as the formation of a `replacement discourse' and the generation of a `language of possibilities ' (1999: 20) . However, Hudson's model of 'discursive justice' does not fully engage with the cultural dynamics of public deliberations and everyday communicative practices about 'justice' -what Bakhtin refers to as the 'eventness of being ' (1993: 78) . In this sense, despite its promise, Habermasian discourse ethics, predicated on consensus, universality, formality, rationality and a purity of speech, remain unchallenged and there is no scope to acknowledge the contributions of the kinds of unruly, communicative forms which pervade cultural life. Given Holquist's view of dialogism (rather than discourse) as the `characteristic epistemological mode' of our world 426 cited in Vice, 1997: 49) , I
want to propose the notion of 'dialogized justice' which takes its cue from the Bakhtinian celebration of the particular, the personal and the prosaic. 'Dialogized justice' permits (indeed promotes) a re-imagination of the public sphere as inherent within the affective, corporeal, expressive and experiential dimensions of social and cultural life. It takes account of others' culturally specific and highly localised experiences, narratives and practices so often overlooked and/or excluded from a universalist, theoreticist perspective. Moreover, 'dialogized justice' furnishes a conceptual language for deliberating the political purchase, the critical publicity of cultural forms and practices such that stand-up comedy -or, for that matter, cartoonography, fashion, street performances, video-gaming, artworks or any other
sphere of cultural activity -should be an integral focus of a critical criminology which has political transformation in its sights.
